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The Eye of the Beholder: Violence as a Social Process
Teresa Koloma Beck, Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany
A triangular reconstruction of the social dynamics of violence offers a means to bridge the gap between research on the micro- and meso-level dynamics of vi-
olent interaction on the one hand, and theories of power and domination on the other. The origins of this approach are found in the phenomenological pro-
gramme of social science violence research formulated by German sociologists in the 1990s (Sofsky, von Trotha, Nedelmann, and others). Reconsidering their 
arguments in the framework of social constructivism, this article reconstructs violence as a triangular process evolving between “performer”, “target” and “ob-
server”. Disentangling the dimensions of the somatic and the social shows, however, that these are not the fixed roles of agents, but changeable modes of ex-
periencing violence. Violent interaction uses the suffering body to stage a positional asymmetry, i.e. a distinction between strength and weakness, between 
above and below, which can be exploited for the production and reproduction of social order.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, violence research in Ger-
many experienced a renewal, against the background of a 
rising number of violent conflicts in the post-Cold War 
world and an ongoing debate about organised violence in 
Nazi Germany. Two approaches became particularly sig-
nificant in the social sciences.1 One was the the so-called 
“Berlin School”, which formed around the works of the 
Berlin-based anthropologist Georg Elwert and his concept 
of markets of violence (Elwert 1997, 1999).2 The second ap-
proach came to be known as phenomenological violence 
research and was inspired by the (highly controversial) 
studies of the sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky (1993, 1996, 
1997, 2003).3 At a time when dominant discourses em-
phasised the barbaric and irrational character of con-
temporary violence,4 the Berlin School and 
phenomenological violence research set out to system-
atically analyse its functions in processes of social structure 
formation. They took different approaches: In the frame-
work of the anthropologically inspired Berlin School, viol-
ence was conceived as one possible form of human action; 
starting from this assumption, research investigated the in-
terrelations between violence and other forms of action, as 
well as between violence and the formation of social struc-
tures.5 The phenomenological approach, by contrast, 
started from the observation that social science violence re-
search so far had neglected the phenomenology of violent 
interaction; therefore, little is yet known about the social 
dynamics of the violent moment itself.6 Against the back-
1  This article and the discussed approaches focus 
on the social dynamics of violence and the gaps in 
social science research on the issue.
2  For a broader discussion of the approach including 
case studies that employ it see Eckert (2004). Elwert’s 
concept of violence was an integral part of his under-
standing of anthropology as a discipline, coined “Scep-
tical Social Anthropology” by Thomas Hüsken (2004).
3  The linguistic style of Sofsky’s work is particu-
larly striking. In an almost literary approach, Sofsky 
composes “thick descriptions” of idealtypical psy-
chological and social dynamics of different forms of 
violence. Von Trotha later coined the approach “the-
oretical ethnography” (1997, 24). For a broader dis-
cussion of the approach see Trotha (1997).
4 The leading paradigm at the time was the “new 
wars” theory (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002, 2005).
5  In this logic, Elwert’s thinking, for example, fo-
cussed on the interrelations between violent action 
and exchange and reconstructed the emergence of a 
particular type of social structure, which he called 
“markets of violence” (Elwert 1997, 1999).
6  It was only towards the end of the 1960s, against 
the background of a statistical increase in acts of viol-
ence in many industrialised countries, that violence en-
tered research agendas (Imbusch 2002, 26). In a recent 
seminal work the German social scientist Jan Philipp 
Reemtsma explores the link between violence and the 
project of modernity, as well as the role of the social 
scientist within it (2008). See also Trotha (1997, 10–16).
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ground of a phenomenologically influenced sociological 
thinking, scholars argued for a social theory of violence 
which starts from a reconstruction of the dynamics of viol-
ent interaction (Trotha 1997, 9–20).
While the Berlin School became influential for empirical 
research on organised violence, the debate about a phe-
nomenological renewal of violence research remained li-
mited to German sociology and hardly outlasted the 
academic careers of its founding figures. The key postulate, 
to combine the phenomenological analysis of violent con-
frontations with social theory, was never fulfilled.7
This article addresses that gap, seeking to outline a social 
theory of violence by reconceptualising central arguments 
of phenomenological violence research in the framework 
of a particular school of social thought: constructivism. 
The central question is: how can social constructivist think-
ing contribute to bridging the conceptual gap between the dy-
namics of violence on a micro-level and processes of social 
structure formation?
The first section reviews the demands of the phenom-
enological school of violence research and introduces the 
etymological distinction between the transitive and in-
transitive meanings of “violence”. Sections two and three 
go on to present a theoretical framework for violence 
 research derived from a combination of the phenom-
enological approach on the one hand and social-con-
structivist thinking on the other, in which the “observer” 
plays a key role. I deliberately avoid arguing in the language 
of any one particular socialconstructivist theory, so as to 
maintain the general potential of such an approach. Sec-
tion four outlines some implications of this approach for 
empirical violence research.
The basic argument is that in a social-constructivist frame-
work violence has to be conceived not as a dyadic, but as a 
triangular dynamic. The social dynamics of violence do not 
evolve simply as a physical confrontation between a “per-
petrator” and a “victim”, but constitutively include a third 
position, namely the “observer”. I distinguish between 
“performer”, “target” and “observer” as three modes of ex-
periencing violence. In this perspective, violence is defined 
as a correlation between inflicting and suffering as observ-
ed by a third party. This approach analytically disentangles 
the dimensions of the somatic and the social, and thus per-
mits a differentiated analysis of the interrelation between 
the two. It will be argued that violent interaction uses the 
suffering body to stage a positional asymmetry, i.e. a dis-
tinction between strength and weakness, above and below, 
which might be socially exploited for the production or re-
production of social order. According to this triangular 
concept of violence the social impact of the somatic pro-
cesses in violent interaction cannot be ascribed to the in-
tensity of the latter; instead, the social consequences of 
violent interaction depend on the incident being observed 
and judged by a public. It will be shown that this per-
spective on violence permits us to bridge the gap between 
research on the micro- and meso-level dynamics of violent 
interaction on one hand, and theories of power, domi-
nation and the formation of social order on the other.
1. Violentia and Potestas: Violence in Interaction and Society
In an article published in 1997, the sociologist Birgitta Ne-
delmann discusses the state of the art of violence research 
and summarises the challenges for consolidating a phe-
nomenologically inspired research agenda. According to 
her, “new violence research” should develop a conceptual 
framework which allows the integration of classical soci-
ological theories of social order and domination; it soci-
ologically conceptualises the injuring of bodies and the 
experience of pain; and, finally, it analyses the subjectively 
intended meaning (in the Weberian sense) of violent action 
(Nedelmann 1997, 72–80).
The ambition of the phenomenological research pro-
gramme was hence not simply to reconstruct violent inter-
7  A major argument against such an approach 
was recently formulated by Slavoj Žižek, who argues 
that the “overpowering horror” of violent acts and 
the resulting empathy with the victim prevent us 
from thinking and from developing “dispassionate” 
scientific concepts (Žižek 2009, 3). A counter-argu-
ment can be formulated in terms of hermeneutic 
thinking, which emphasises that the researcher and 
his or her emotions are always involved in social 
science research; in this regard, violence might be 
different in degree, but not in kind.
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actions on a micro-level (as a reading of Sofsky’s works 
especially might suggest), but to bridge the gap between 
such micro-level analyses and processes of social structure 
formation at large. In a broader sense, the phenom-
enological research programme demanded an exploration 
of the interrelations between (a particular form of) inter-
action on the one hand, and the (re-)production of 
broader social structures on the other. Rephrasing the 
problem this way draws attention to the correspondence 
between the phenomenological agenda of violence research 
and schools of social thought which consider interactions 
as being decisive for the formation and reproduction of so-
cial structures.
The constitutive interdependency between interactions and 
social structures is present in all socialconstructivist the-
ories. It echoes in post-structuralist approaches such as 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and field (Bourdieu 
1989) and Michel Foucault’s discourse theory (Foucault 
1977), but also in Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory 
(Luhmann 1984, 1995) or Anthony Giddens’s theory of 
structuration (Giddens 1984); it is particular pronounced 
in Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer 1977). So far, however, 
the possible insights to be drawn from a combination of 
social constructivist theory on the one hand, and a phe-
nomenological approach to violence research on the other 
have not been systematically explored.
In the case of violence, this interdependency between inter-
action and broader social structures seems to be reflected 
in the very etymology of the notion, as over the course of 
linguistic history the meaning oscillates between a transi-
tive and an intransitive pole (Bowman 2001). While in its 
transitive sense “violence” denotes a relationship between a 
subject and an object in interaction, it indicates a property 
or potential of a subject in its intransitive meaning and 
thus refers to structural aspects. In both the Latin and the 
Anglo-Saxon languages, the transitive meaning prevailed: 
“[t]he exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or 
cause damage to, persons or property; action or conduct 
characterised by this; treatment or usage tending to cause 
bodily injury or forcibly interfering with personal free-
dom” (OED, “violence”). This understanding of violence 
evokes an image of transgression, of an integral space that 
is broken in a situation of interaction.8
Historically this transitive meaning was preceded by an in-
transitive one. The Latin violentia from which “violence” is 
derived initially signified “vehemence”, “force” or “im-
petuosity”.9 Instead of referring to a relationship between a 
subject and an object, the notion of violence originally in-
dicated a property or an enduring potential of a subject 
only (Bowman 2001, 25–26). Eventually this ambiguity was 
solved by bifurcation: violentia was reduced to the transi-
tive meaning with which it is associated today, while the in-
transitive aspects were referred to the notion of potestas. 
Latin and Anglo-Saxon languages reflect this linguistic dis-
tinction between “power”/pouvoir/poder and “viol-
ence”/violence/violencia. The German expression Gewalt, 
by contrast, still echoes the ambiguity of the Latin root 
(Imbusch 2002, 28–29).10
Efforts to conceive a social theory of “violence” can benefit 
from this linguistic distinction between transitive and in-
transitive meaning. From the transitive usage of the word 
we can infer, firstly, that violence is a social process; the no-
tion refers to a relationship involving a subject and an ob-
ject. Secondly, the transitive usage suggests that the 
processes in question typically unfold in interactions and 
are thus related to the realm of the somatic, to the bodily 
aspects of human existence. The originally intransitive 
meaning of the word, however, reminds us, thirdly, that fo-
cussing on the violent act alone reduces our understanding 
of the phenomenon. Like a stone falling into water to cre-
ate spreading ripples that may change the lines in the sand 
on a distant shore, violence transcends the moment of in-
flicted harm and comes to be inscribed into the structure 
of society itself. In section two I move on to investigate the 
transitive dimension of violence, reconstructing the social 
dynamics of violent interaction. Section three then ex-
8  The obvious exception is auto-aggressive behav-
iour, such as suicide or self-mutilation, in which the 
subject and object of action coincide.
9 The Latin root of violentia is vis, which means 
force or bodily strength.
10  The intransitive dimension of the notion is still 
present in expressions such as Staatsgewalt (“state 
power”).
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plores the intransitive dimension, examining how the so-
matic processes which evolve in violent interaction are 
related to processes of social structure formation and dy-
namics of power and domination.
2. The Violent Moment: Three Modes of Experiencing Violent Interaction
More than other forms of human action, violence has the 
potential to produce transformations of the social, because 
violence is characterised by a juxtaposition of social pro-
cesses and the somatic aspects of human existence. Viol-
ence is a technique of making the body a site of social 
bargaining processes.
Violent action targets the body upon which injuries are in-
flicted with pain being the result. Pain is always an exist-
ential human experience that fundamentally shakes 
self-awareness. It deprives the individual of the familiar in-
strumentality of the body and confronts him or her with 
their bodily existence.11 Moreover, it creates isolation since 
the experience of pain cannot be shared and can hardly be 
communicated. Prolonged states of pain therefore erode 
the sense of time and open up the gates to despair (Trotha 
1997, 28–29).
Experiencing pain inflicted by violent action is, however, 
particular. The target shares the loneliness, isolation and 
despair of all other pain sufferers. But one who suffers in 
violent interaction does so conscious that the pain is not 
the result of fate or hazard (as in the case of accidents or 
illnesses), but has been brought about intentionally by 
someone else. It is injury and pain inflicted deliberately to 
enforce the will of one against the resistance of the other 
(Trotha 1997, 31).
Violence can be described as a social process whose func-
tion is to negotiate and reconfigure a relationship. Yet this 
process does not follow a random path; instead it is shaped 
by the structural principle of asymmetry, by the attempt to 
create a positional difference between the actors involved 
(Baecker 1996, 99–100; Simon 2000, 109). Violence can 
therefore be described as a social technique that uses the 
body to mark and/or (re-)produce an asymmetric constel-
lation in which the inferior position is associated with the 
experience of suffering, while the superior position is as-
sociated with the experience of inflicting suffering. Initially 
this difference is but situational; the positions of the one 
who suffers and the one who inflicts suffering can – in 
principle – be reversed. Yet, depending on the context and 
dynamics of the situation, the asymmetry might be per-
petuated. In this case, violence produces subjects with 
complementary identities, which are commonly denoted as 
“perpetrator” and “victim”.12
These two notions are, however, linked to strong value 
judgments and emotions. Moreover, they evoke the idea of 
“perpetrator” and “victim” being definite roles of agents. 
As we will see in the following, contradicting a widespread 
assumption, the contingency or reversibility of positions is 
crucial for understanding the social dynamics of violence. 
Instead of speaking about “victims” and “perpetrators”, 
the notions of “target” and “performer” will be used here 
to refer to the two different positions. Rather than roles of 
agents, “target” and “performer” should be understood as 
different modes of experiencing violence.13 The “target” is 
associated with the damage to the body, with states of suf-
fering or passivity, with feelings of fear and pain, with in-
feriority; it is where the existential character of violence 
derives from. The position of the “performer”, by contrast, 
is associated with intentional action aiming at damaging 
another body, with superiority and the exercise of power. 
Although these modes might, as mentioned above, lead to 
the formation of a particular subjectivity (as “victim” or a 
“perpetrator”, for example) and although the formation of 
such subjectivities might frequently be a principle moti-
11  As Trutz von Trotha remarks in this regard, in-
tense pain can change the experience of positionality 
in the sense described by Helmuth Plessner. The 
latter argues that the particularity of being human – 
in contrast to animals or plants – consists in being 
able to extend existence beyond the borders of the 
body, establishing artificial borders and embodying 
them (Plessner 1928). According to this argument, 
in experiencing pain man (temporarily) drops out 
of the species, approaching states of animal or even 
plant existence (Trotha 1997, 29).
12 In the following, quotation marks are used to 
indicate the non-ontological character of these ex-
pressions.
13  A similar idea can be found in Ivana Maček’s 
anthropological work on the war in Sarajevo (2001). 
She distinguishes between three “modes” of experi-
encing war, the “civilian-”, the “soldier-” and the 
“deserter mode”, understood as three ethically dif-
ferent ways of perceiving the war which introduce 
different choices of action and different legitimising 
narratives (Maček, 2001, 218-219).
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vation for initiating violent interaction, such a devel-
opment is far from preordained: not every brawl or battle 
produces the dyad of victimisation and empowerment.
At first glance, the complementary modes of experience, 
“performer” and “target”, seem to comprise what is essen-
tial for analysing violence. They permit us to reconstruct the 
relational dynamics of the situation as well as its somatic as-
pects. Yet, considering violence as a social process, we have 
to move beyond the confrontation of “performer” and “tar-
get” in the violent act to include a third mode of experience: 
that of the “observer”. It is only by bringing in this last per-
spective that the social dynamics of violence can be truly 
understood. Violence is not simply physical harm intention-
ally inflicted by one person on another. It is not limited to 
the asymmetrical dyad of “performer” and a “target”. As a 
social process it evolves in a triangle where it is not only ex-
ercised and suffered, but also observed and judged.
The idea of violence evolving in a triangular constellation 
appears in various approaches. Communicative aspects of 
violence, with an emphasis on the role of the public, are 
most prominently treated in the research on terrorism 
(Schmid and Graaf 1982; Waldmann 2005). With regard to 
armed group behaviour in civil wars Stathis Kalyvas argues 
in the same direction, pointing out that the main function 
of selective violence is to enforce “compliance” to armed 
rule among the (observing) population (Kalyvas 2006). 
Under the expression “bystander”, the role of the “observ-
er” has been intensively discussed in genocide research 
(Vetlesen 2000; Barnett 1999; Grünfeld and Huijboom 
2007; Hilberg 1995).14
The major difference between these works and the pro-
position advanced in this article can be best understood by 
examining the function of the “observer” in the respective 
concepts. The above-mentioned approaches conceive the 
“observer” as being crucial for the emergence and dy-
namics of particular forms of violence (such as terrorism, 
civil war or genocide); in stark contrast, the triangular con-
cept proposed here introduces the observer as a constitutive 
third element in the social dynamics of violence.15
Another important difference is that, as pointed out above, 
“performer”, “target” and “observer” are not conceived as 
definite roles of particular agents; instead they are modes 
of experiencing violence, which, in a given violent inter-
action, might oscillate between different agents.
Introducing the “observer” as a third constitutive element 
in a social theory of violence has a major implication: it 
permits us to analytically disentangle the dimensions of the 
somatic and the social. While experiencing violence as a 
“performer” or as a “target” means to be caught in the 
physical and emotional dynamics of a violent con-
frontation, the “observer” mode is in no sense predeter-
mined. The “observer” breaks the hermetic circle of 
injuring and suffering, and is associated instead with con-
sideration and decision. In this mode violence transcends 
the immediate confrontation and enters the realms of 
judgement, debate and memory. It is here that the shift 
from the transitive meaning of the notion as violentia to its 
intransitive meaning as potestas takes place.
The most important consequence of this approach for em-
pirical research is that “violence” is no longer conceived as 
an empirically evident phenomenon. At first glance, of 
course, the commonly assumed obviousness of violence 
stands to reason because of the somatic character of the 
processes in question: as violence deals with physical 
bodies, it is apparent to the senses and should easily be 
perceived. Taking a closer look, however, this common-
sensical understanding is all but unambiguous: everyday 
experience is full of controversies about whether a certain 
14  With regard to the individual, the “bystander ef-
fect” has been intensely researched in social psycho-
logy. Also known as the Genovese syndrome, the no-
tion refers to the individual’s failure to help in an 
emergency situation. The latter, however, include ac-
cidents and similar situations as well as violent in-
teractions(Latane and Darley 1970).
15  In his study on trust and violence in modernity, 
the literary scholar and social scientist Jan Philipp 
Reemtsma also argues for integrating the third party 
as a constitutive element in concepts of violence 
(Reemtsma 2008, 467–82). As a general idea, this 
thought can already be found in Riches’s Anthropol-
ogy of Violence (1986).
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interaction, for example spanking a child, barging into a 
crowded train, or forcing a kiss on a woman just met in a 
bar should or should not be considered violence. In spite 
of the obviousness of the somatic processes is question, 
the use of the notion of “violence” to describe them is all 
but undisputed.
The theoretical reconstruction of violence as a triangular 
rather than dyadic dynamic systematises this contingency, 
emphasising that the concept of “violence” refers to a par-
ticular mode of observation more than to a certain type of 
interaction. It can be defined as a correlation between in-
flicting and suffering as observed by a third. Although this 
attribution might be more compelling in some instances 
than in others, it is contingent. What is considered violence 
depends on social norms and individual values, on criteria, 
thus, which lie in the eye of the beholder.
Among the three modes of experiencing violence, the “ob-
server” is the most inclusive. The reason for this is that post 
factum all agents involved (as far as they are still alive) be-
come “observers” of the violent interaction as they re-
member, reflect, judge, decide. Violent action tends to 
generate its own public; even if not witnessed in the mo-
ment of its occurrence, the spoiled body itself comes to tes-
tify to violent action until long after the fact. The 
“observer” mode is, hence, not limited to witnesses of viol-
ence in actu. Instead, it relates to a variety of publics cre-
ated – intentionally or not – by the violent act: the 
paralysed and frightened eyewitness, the “performer’s” 
cheering, goading peer group, global media stridently con-
demning the deeds, the researcher analysing the situation 
are all possible manifestations of the “observer” mode of 
experiencing violence.
Considering the social dynamics of violence, the “observ-
er” mode is, finally, the most striking indicator of the re-
lational fragility of violent situations. The commonsensical 
understanding of violence, which mistakes “performer”, 
“target” and “observer” for definite roles of particular 
agents neglects that violent interaction frequently takes 
place in unsettled situations, in which positions can be re-
versed quickly: one moment’s “observer” might be next 
moment’s “performer”; today’s “performer” might be to-
morrow’s “target”, and so forth. Usually, the agents’ knowl-
edge about this interchangeability of positions is an 
important factor in the dynamics of violent interactions: 
where the fear of victimisation is driving the actions of 
“performers” and “observers”, violent situations quickly 
gain momentum.
In this sense the “observer” might become decisive for the 
evolution of a violent interaction. Her or his relative posi-
tion to the “performer” and the “target” is crucial in defin-
ing the potential and limitations of a violent situation: an 
“observer” sympathising with the “target” potentially li-
mits the options of the “performer”, whereas a timid or 
even applauding “observer” affirms and encourages the vi-
olent assault.
The “observer” is hence crucial when it comes to the social 
effects of the somatic processes evolving in violent inter-
action; or, to use the distinction introduced above, he or 
she is pivotal for understanding how the transitive and the 
intransitive dynamics of “violence” are intertwined. Hav-
ing explored the former in this section, we will now turn to 
the latter and discuss the role of violence in the formation 
of social structures.
3. Beyond the Violent Moment: Violence and the (Re-)Production of Social 
Order
According to the research agenda proposed by Nedelmann 
(see section one), so-called new violence research should 
not be limited to the theoretical reconstruction of violent 
interactions. Instead it should attempt to combine these 
considerations with theories of power, domination and the 
formation of social structures at large (Nedelmann 1997, 
72–80). This demand was motivated by the prominent role 
of the notion of violence in classical theories of domi-
nation: in Max Weber’s thinking, violence, or rather the 
credibly institutionalised threat thereof, is conceived as the 
basis of domination. This very idea is already to be found 
in the political philosophy of state formation of Jean Bodin 
(1606) and Thomas Hobbes (1992 [1651]). In this per-
spective, social order is dependent upon the successful 
monopolisation of the potential for violent action (Weber 
1978, 54). These works thus focus on what had once been 
the intransitive dimension of the notion of violence.
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The triangular reconstruction of violence proposed in the 
preceding section permits us to reframe the propositions of 
a classical Weberian sociology of domination, linking the 
intransitive meaning of violence as potestas to the inter-
action processes associated with the transitive meaning as 
violentia. A first step in this direction was undertaken by the 
German sociologist Heinrich Popitz who was a major in-
spiration to the violence research renewal movement in the 
1990s. In Phänomene der Macht (Phenomena of Power) 
(1986) Popitz sets out to refine the role of violence in a 
Weberian sociology.16 Introducing the concept of action 
into Weber’s theoretical framework he proposes conceiving 
violence as the most direct form of power, as power in ac-
tion, or, as he put it, “pure action power” (schiere Aktions-
macht) (Popitz 1986, 68, my translation), which is rooted in 
the general vulnerability (Verletzungsoffenheit) of man (69). 
On the basis of this discussion of phenomenological aspects 
of violent interaction, Popitz insists on the systematic role 
of violence in the formation of broader social structures: 
“Violence in general and the violence of killing in particular 
is not just an accident of social relations, not a side issue of 
social order and not just an extreme case or ultima ratio 
(about which not much fuss can be made). Violence is ac-
tually … an ever-present option of human action. No com-
prehensive social order is based on the assumption of 
non-violence. The power to kill and the powerlessness of 
the victim are latent or manifest determinants of the struc-
ture of social coexistence” (translated from Popitz 1986, 83).
Unlike Weber, whose writings discuss the monopolisation of 
violence in terms of a technical problem arising out of the 
process of state formation, Popitz’s phenomenological work 
traces how the natural presence of the potential of violence, 
combined with universal knowledge about the consequences 
of violence acted out, has an ordering effect on society. He 
links the structures of society to the dynamics of violent in-
teraction and, in doing so, calls attention to the fact that vi-
olence, in the guise of contingency, is also inscribed into 
social structures characterised by the absence of violent in-
teraction. The German sociologist Dirk Baecker went on to 
demonstrate that the latter holds true not only for processes 
of socialisation at large in the sense proposed by Bodin, 
Hobbes or Weber, but also on the meso- and micro-level 
(Baecker 1996, 94–95). The triangular concept of violence 
permits us to theoretically refine this relationship between 
violent interaction and the formation of social structures.
As elaborated above, violent interaction follows the structu-
ral principle of asymmetry, attempting to stage a positional 
difference by means of the suffering body, a contrast between 
strength and weakness, above and below, superiority and in-
feriority. If the perception of this positional difference can be 
perpetuated, the latter might be used for the establishment 
or reproduction of a social order based on domination and 
subordination. In this case, violent interaction produces par-
ticular asymmetric and complementary subjectivities on the 
side of the “performer” as well as the “target”.
In this regard, violence is functionally equivalent to other 
social techniques of asymmetrisation, such as defamation or 
derision. The latter, too, stage and/or (re-)produce an asym-
metry that is exploitable in a relationship of power. The par-
ticularity of violence, however, stems from the fact that the 
asymmetry is produced by threatening not only the social or 
mental integrity of the agent, but also the physical con-
ditions of her or his existence. Given the general vulnerabil-
ity of the human body, the performance of violence needs 
neither sophisticated equipment nor specialised knowledge 
to be effective. Violence is, in the words of von Trotha, an 
“everybody‘s resource” (translated from 1997, 25).
Moreover, the somatic character of violence reduces the 
ambiguity inherent in any communication. Violence is ap-
parent to the senses; and as the memory of violent acts is 
embodied in wounds or scars, the sensuosity of violence 
transcends the moment of violent action itself. Violence is 
easily accessible, easily perceivable and easily understood 
(Riches 1986, 11) and therefore reduces the contingencies 
inherent in any communication. Baecker speaks of violence 
as “deoptionalised communication”, which forces par-
ticular attributions and dramatically narrows the range of 
possible ensuing communications (1996, 101).
16 Unfortunately, the book has not been translated 
into English.
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More than other social techniques of asymmetrisation, 
 violence therefore bears the potential to perpetuate the per-
ception of a positional difference produced in a confronta -
tion and turn it into the social basis of domination building 
on asymmetric and complementary subjectivities. As any so-
cial order is based on the production and reproduction of 
differences, violence is, hence, a potent instrument for estab-
lishing social order and transforming the social environment.
The same argument could, of course, be conceived in the 
framework of a dyadic theory of violence. Yet, the triangu-
lar reconstruction of violence proposed here implies one 
major dissimilarity. Introducing the “observer” as a third 
constitutive element draws attention to the contingency of 
the processes in question: in a dyadic concept the social dy-
namics of violence are conceived as unfolding only in the 
confrontation between a “target” and a “performer”. The 
problem of such a representation is that it risks confusing 
the social and somatic dimensions of the processes in ques-
tion. The dyadic reconstruction of violence suggests a cor-
respondence between the somatic and the social in the 
sense that the social impact of “violence” is assumed to be a 
function of the intensity of the somatic occurrences. Yet the 
everyday debates mentioned above, which question the ad-
equacy of the notion of “violence” for spanking a child or 
forcing a kiss , already illustrate the shakiness of this as-
sumption.
The triangular reconstruction, by contrast, implies that the 
social effects of the dyadic, somatic events do depend not 
on the severity of the latter, but on the perception of the 
processes in question by a third party. It suggests that, so-
cially, the question of whether or not certain occurrences 
are “violence” can never be decided by any objective crite-
ria, but depend on the perspective, i.e. the norms, values 
and objectives, of an “observer”.
One major implication of this approach is that it permits 
us to conceive not only the presence of violence as observ-
ed by a third party, but also the absence of this observation. 
Rigorously conceiving violence as socially constructed 
implies that different “observers” might judge the same 
proceedings differently. And it suggests that the formation 
of such an observation is open to manipulation. The ap-
proach therefore draws attention to processes and tech-
niques which either deliberately stage “violence” or 
attempt to invisibilise it.
Contradicting the commonsensical assumption that viol-
ence is a process that is by definition initiated by a “per-
former” causing injury, the triangular reconstruction 
implies that “violence” might also be enacted on the side of 
the “target” by staging suffering – independently of the ac-
tual intensity of the somatic events in question and even 
independently of the actual intention of the perceived 
“performer”. As long as the somatic intensity is low, the so-
cial dynamics of “violence” depend chiefly on the victims 
propensity to display suffering– or not to. In this sense, 
even a kiss might come to be observed as violence.
As pointed out above, the triangular reconstruction draws 
attention not only to processes of staging violence, but also 
those of invisibilising it. What might appear as violence to a 
critical observer can be discursively reframed so as to con-
ceal the coercive character of the measures in question: “tor-
ture” or “enhanced interrogation methods”, “forced 
sterilisation” or “prevention of hereditary disease in off-
spring”, “massacre” or “mass execution”, “genital muti-
lation” or “ritual circumcision” – the list of such alternative 
descriptions of identical occurrences could be extended ad 
lib. In each of the conceptual pairs, the first description spot-
lights the coercive character of the action of the performer 
and the suffering of the target intentionally provoked by it; 
the second variant, by contrast, clouds these aspects by em-
phasising the legitimacy of the action deriving from its role 
in the production or reproduction of social order.
Techniques and processes of socially staging and invisibilis-
ing “violence” ultimately point to the problem of legit-
imacy that violence can never escape. Many scholars have 
pointed out that violent interaction is always a contestable 
social act, which has to be justified (Riches 1986, 5–8; 
Schlichte 2009, 85–115). Not by chance, Weber defines the 
state as the possessor of the monopoly of legitimate violence 
on a given territory (1978, 54).
In a triangular reconstruction of violence, the interrelation 
between violence and legitimacy can be further refined: 
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rigorously conceiving violence as socially constructed 
implies that different “observers” might judge the same 
proceedings differently, which ultimately draws attention 
to the manipulability of the observation. With regard to the 
problem of legitimacy, this manipulability can be exploited 
by the “performer” as well as by the “target”: to prevent de-
legitimisation “performers” can not only adjust violent ac-
tion according to the norms and values of relevant 
“observers”, but also attempt to discursively reframe ac-
tions which risk being observed as “violence”. Conversely, 
delegitimisation can be introduced on the side of the “tar-
get” by performing suffering and thus staging violence.
These dynamics of legitimisation and delegitimisation 
through violence are particularly important when it comes 
to the establishment and reproduction of a monopoly of 
power. As pointed out by theories of state-building from 
Hobbes to Tilly, violence plays a central role in the estab-
lishment of social order on the large scale (Hobbes 1992; 
Tilly 1975; 1985). In the medium and long term this central 
role of violence in the emergence and reproduction of so-
cial order risks jeopardising the legitimacy of the latter. 
Therefore, the monopolisation of the potential for violence 
is systematically combined with a reinterpretation of the 
coercive actions of the monopolising power. Yet, as the co-
ercive action persists, the discursive manipulation remains 
open to contestation: delegitimising the powerful by draw-
ing attention to the suffering caused by coercive actions, by 
speaking of “torture” and “massacres” instead of “en-
hanced interrogation methods” and “mass executions” is 
therefore one of the most threatening instruments in the 
hands of the less powerful, especially in contexts that culti-
vate the ideal of non-violence.
4. Implications for Empirical Research
The key implication of the triangular concept of violence 
for empirical research is the shift from conceiving “viol-
ence” as being empirically evident to conceiving it as being 
socially constructed. Accordingly, empirical research has to 
investigate how this construction takes place. In the 
triangular framework proposed here, the inter-
dependencies between the somatic dynamics on the one 
hand, and their social effects on the other, will be crucial. 
Attention, hence, turns not only to processes in which 
asymmetries are staged on a somatic level, but simulta-
neously to the question of how these processes are observ-
ed, described and judged by an idealtypical third party. 
Accordingly, phenomena of violence can be differentiated 
in terms of two characteristics: (a) the somatic intensity of 
the processes in question, i.e. the intensity of the bodily 
transgression, which might be high or low; and (b) the so-
cial observability thereof, which, again, might be high or 
low. The somatic intensity of the events is crucial in deter-
mining the scope of possible attributions and interpre-
tations; while in cases of low somatic intensity it might be 
possible to deny (or stage) the intention to inflict suffering, 
cases of high somatic intensity narrow the range of poss-
ible interpretations. The somatic intensity also affects the 
agents’ capacity to choose action. The social observability 
of the same events, by contrast, is critical in determining in 
how far a particular occurrence can become a subject of 
debate at all; therefore, the social impact of any struggle 
over interpretation will be particularly pronounced in cases 
where the events in question can be widely observed. 
Table 1 summarises the possible combined expressions of 
the two characteristics.
Low somatic intensity
High somatic intensity
Low social observability
1
2
High social observability
3
4
In each of the four idealtypical cases the social production 
(or obscuration) of violence takes place under different 
conditions and the options of the “performer”, the “target” 
and the “observer” vary accordingly. In empirical research, 
the distinction between the somatic and the social dimen-
sion might, hence, serve to differentiate dynamics of viol-
ence as well as to analyse processes of transition from one 
form to another.
To further develop this approach, research in two direc-
tions is needed. First, the figure of the “observer” has to be 
conceptually refined, in particular in view of its possible 
empirical manifestations and the related social functions. 
Empirical and theoretical work is necessary to fulfil this 
goal. Empirical research can draw on insights from those 
Table 1: Social observability and somatic intensity
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areas of violence research where the “observer” or the 
“public” already plays a central role, such as genocide or 
terrorism research (cf. section two). Starting from there, 
the social “production” of “targets” and “perpetrators”, of 
“victims” and “performers” should be explored in a gen-
eral perspective, investigating diverse settings of organised 
and unorganised violence. Theoretically, the differentiated 
elaboration of the “observer” can benefit from a number of 
recent pieces of research on the conceptual figure of the 
“third party”.17
Based on this refinement of the third party, a second chal-
lenge for further developing this approach can be met: to 
explore and to conceptualise the interplay between the so-
cial and the somatic in the social production of violence. A 
central question in this regard is in how far particular so-
matic dynamics limit the possible range of communicative 
responses and interpretations and how these limitations 
are dealt with socially.
5. Conclusion
Drawing on the phenomenological critique of violence re-
search, to develop a theoretical concept of violence in the 
framework of social-constructivism, violence can be con-
ceived as a triangular dynamic evolving between a “per-
former”, a “target” and an “observer”. The latter is pivotal 
in establishing meaning and judgement, in introducing the 
political dimension of violent interaction. This analytical 
perspective permits us to integrate the instrumental and 
the expressive dimension of violent interactions; it allows 
us to conceive violence as an act as well as an image, or, to 
put it differently, as an instrument efficiently serving prac-
tical as well as symbolic needs (Riches 1986, 11, 13). Viol-
ent action is thus not simply a means to pursue particular 
ends, but first and foremost a way to create, stage or change 
asymmetric relationships (cf. Simon 2000, 108–109).
Including the “observer” as a third constitutive element in 
a social theory of violence permits us to conceptually 
bridge the gap between analyses of violent interaction on 
the one hand, and discussions of violence in the sense of 
potestas on the other. This theoretical framework allows to 
systematically link research on the empirical dynamics of 
violent interaction with theories of social order, power and 
domination.
17  See for example Boltanski (1999), Fischer 
(2006), Werron (2010). The sociologist Gesa Linde-
mann even argues for a triangular conception of 
“sociality” in general (2006).
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